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“You cannot do evil that good will result.” The Latin version of this motto was printed on AAVS’s literature and stationery for decades. It encapsulates our principles so neatly. Good and evil; right and wrong. These are distinctions that we try to teach young children, but some of the most educated people on earth who work in science seem to not apply them to consideration of animals.

Many of us instinctively feel and act with compassion towards animals, and may not feel the need to ponder what is the animals’ due, and where ethical lines are drawn. But we recognize with satisfaction when we hear or read something that articulates ideas that percolate in us and validates what we know to be true. Reading through this issue of the AV Magazine, you may not agree with everything you read—the views presented are not necessarily AAVS’s positions either—but hopefully, you will gain a new perspective, and see the reasoned basis for moving forward from our controversy-filled present.

Last year, I was invited to speak to a group of scholars at the Yale University Interdisciplinary Center for Bioethics’ Animal Ethics Working Group. The organizer was Joel Marks, who has our gratitude for advising our editors on this issue of the AV Magazine and who wrote the first article. In preparing, I pulled out my old copy of Animal Liberation, by Peter Singer, often regarded as the landmark book, published in 1975, that launched the modern animal rights movement. Although a few organizations like AAVS had long argued the moral failure of vivisection and other animal abuse, Singer’s work, and the work of other modern philosophical pioneers, including long-time AAVS friend Tom Regan, did nothing less than challenge our whole society to turn away from a human-centered view. Not an easy task, but during my visit to Yale, I realized how much impact that challenge has made. Clearly, many scholars are engaged and genuinely attracted to the intellectual honesty that the consideration of animals’ rights demands. They will continue to develop a vision for a better world.

So here is a challenge for you! As I write this, the holiday season looms, with reunions for many of us with family and friends. What a great opportunity in the midst of celebrating the light of good will at the darkest time of year, to initiate discussions about how we regard animals, using this magazine as a guide through the choppy waters of ethics, morals, philosophy, and even religion.

Let your moral compass be your guide.

Sue A. Leary
Vivisection And Ethics: Cutting To The Quick

The central contradiction of vivisection is that animals are used for research precisely because of their similarities to humans, and yet by that very use they are implicitly denied a place in the moral community. Somehow our commonality of physiology and sentience is deemed to be a completely separate matter from our respective rights, including the most basic right simply to be let alone. Procedures that ethical researchers would never think to perform on human beings are, in consequence, routinely performed on other animals.

The very condition of being an animal who is used for experimentation would be ruled out for a human being, since at a minimum it involves involuntary confinement and isolation. Beyond this, countless animals are subjected to invasive practices, including the most invasive of all: manipulation of their very nature by being bred specifically for experimental purposes. Thus, vivisection is not simply a particular event in the lifespan of an animal—awful as that might be—but the total subjugation of an animal to the control and ambitions of human beings from artificial birth to premature death.

For an antivivisectionist, considerations such as these make the cessation of animal use in testing, research, experimentation, education, and training an open-and-shut case. But of course there are arguments on both sides. In this regard a recent editorial in the science journal *Nature* is instructive.\(^1\) It concerns what is described and applauded as “a major accomplishment,” namely, the creation in the laboratory of primates who can pass on to their offspring a gene that had been implanted from a different organism, a so-called transgene. The significance of this feat is that the primate in question, the marmoset, is closer genetically to humans than is the current “model” of choice, the mouse. Therefore, medical science will have available to it a better means of testing theories about human diseases and, possibly as well, neuroscience about brain functioning. The research community is excited.

But the thrust of the editorial is not so much to praise the breakthrough as to warn the Japanese researchers who pioneered the new procedure that they had better brace for controversy and public confrontation. Yes, those pesky antivivisectionists are going to get all fired up about this. Much in the manner of a boxing coach, therefore, the editors, who express their support for the research “as long as [it is] carried out in a responsible fashion,” advise the researchers to “be ready to deal with the broader ethical questions involved.”

But to the antivivisectionist this sounds paradoxical, for would not “a thorough understanding of the ethical issues” lead one to conclude that the research in question ought not to be done? I think there is a double lesson for antivivisectionists to draw. First is that antivivisectionists too should be thoroughly versed in the relevant argumentation coming from both sides. Second is that antivivisectionists too should recognize and respect the genuine motives of their opponents.

In sum, the issues are real ones. How, then, do vivisectors go about defending their work? Their first line of defense is that the use of nonhuman animals is necessary for achieving certain laudable goals. Uppermost in most people’s minds will of course be the maintenance of human health and safety. In critiquing this argument,
antivivisectionists should keep in mind the two modes of refutation, namely, (1) false, or questionable, premise and (2) illogic. Regarding the first: the premise of the vivisectionist’s argument can in many cases be refuted when an animal is being used for some relatively trivial purpose, such as testing a new cosmetic, or when a substitute for animals is available, such as microbial cells or computer models. I should point out, by the way, that this applies to the antivivisectionist as well; that is, since the only reason to eat animals or animal products, such as eggs and diary, is for taste or convenience, the same principle clearly implies that all antivivisectionists should be vegans.

But even when the vivisectionist’s argument has a true or plausible premise, it is possible to lodge the objection that its conclusion does not follow. One area of animal use that raises this issue exquisitely is so-called “pure” or basic research, for example, neuroscience, where the objective is to advance human knowledge for its own sake. Consider this statement by a philosopher whose own research depends in part on the work of vivisectors:

“The kittens and the macaques we continually sacrifice in experimental consciousness research are not interested in a theory of consciousness; the results of these experiments are of interest only to our species. However, we pursue this interest by making members of other species suffer, forcing highly unpleasant states of consciousness on them and even denying their right to exist. How coherent is this from an ethical perspective? As a theoretician, do I have the right to interpret data gathered by making animals suffer? Am I morally obliged to boycott these types of experiments?”

Of course, a common argument by the vivisectionist is that basic research may also lead to practical applications for human welfare. So let us cut to the quick and ask about the justification of vivisection in research that shows clear promise of benefiting human beings in significant ways. Here the strategy of objection would be to argue that no matter how much good could be brought about, certain things simply should not be done. Everyone recognizes this principle; it is the reason nonhumans are vivisected rather than humans, since to submit the latter to such procedures would be considered unconscionable (except by sadistic Nazis). This form of argument is notable, however, for being the strongest from the point of view of the antivivisectionist and the weakest from the point of view of the vivisectionist. It is strongest because it appeals to very deep intuitions, but that makes it weakest for people who happen not to share those intuitions.

For example, there is research that purports to show that a rat who has been deliberately crippled doesn’t seem to mind this state of being and just goes about the rest of its short life dragging its useless rear limbs behind it. Apparently, to some researchers this means that it’s okay to use rats in this way if doing so would, say, contribute to aiding human stroke victims. To the antivivisectionist this shows that these researchers are lacking an elemental sensibility. The researchers’ view is that absent pain, absent a problem. The vivisection view is that intentionally crippling a living organism is itself intrinsically wrong. It is not clear that rational argument could ever resolve a difference like this. I chose this example to give the vivisectionist every benefit of the doubt. There are other cases, however, where an animal’s distress is an essential feature of an experiment, for example, in research on pain itself; so there would be no way to deny it, other than to offer the problematic consolation that the animal will be euthanized shortly thereafter.

At this juncture, ethics comes into its own. For a distinguishing feature of ethics as commonly conceived is that it trumps cost/benefit analysis. Thus, even if we were to grant every claim of the vivisectionist regarding the necessity of certain experiments on animals to bring about an overwhelming good—indeed, even a good for other animals of the same species as the individuals being experimented on—it would not follow ethically that the experiments were justified. For it would also have to be shown that the experiments did not violate any ethical principle of proper treatment of an animal, human or otherwise.

Curiously, then, ultimate resolution of the very practical issue of vivisection may depend on agreement about the abstract nature of ethics. If vivisectionists agree that the end does not always justify the means, which is implicit in their using animals rather than humans in the first place, then, on pain of contradiction, they would seem bound to refrain from using the animals either. By the same token, what antivivisectionists must be prepared to acknowledge is that their position could have a real cost, namely, retard ing research into relief from illness and pain. Thus, when applied to the vivisection debate, ethics is a double-edged scalpel.

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RESOURCES:
Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees (IACUCs) oversee research institutions’ animal programs and have played an important role in reducing some of the worst abuses of animals in laboratories, but they have yet to tackle a central issue—questioning the justification and necessity of using animals for research in the first place.

As part of a system of protections for animals used in research, testing, and education, IACUCs are required to be established at every research institution that uses animals covered by the Animal Welfare Act (AWA). According to the AWA, any investigator who wishes to use animals must submit an animal use proposal to the IACUC (though these provisions do not apply to birds, rats, and mice bred for use in research, or fish, reptiles, and other cold-blooded animals, who are all excluded from protection by the AWA). The IACUC is, in essence, the institution’s watchdog, responsible for reviewing and approving the proposals, as well as overseeing the animal care program in general.

Most people would think that a body responsible for assessing an animal research program would consider whether or not the proposed uses of animals are justifiable. This is, after all, the key ethical issue surrounding animal research: when, if ever, is it acceptable to subject an animal to confinement in a laboratory and experimental manipulation?

IACUCs, however, are not explicitly authorized to review protocols for their ethical merit. They are not required to ask whether the knowledge to be gained from the proposed experiment outweighs the costs to the animals in terms of suffering and compromised welfare. In contrast, the animal use committees established by law in most other developed nations specifically require this kind of ethical review, and frequently name these committees animal ethics committees.

Though there is arguably room in the regulatory language governing IACUCs to allow for broader animal welfare issues to be considered, most IACUCs confine themselves to rather narrow deliberations, focusing on details of anesthetic protocols or procedures for administration of pain-relieving medication. Seen from the context of Russell and Burch’s Three Rs—refinement of methods to minimize pain, suffering, or distress; reduction in the number of animals used to obtain a certain amount of information; and replacement of animals with non-animal methods—IACUCs typically focus heavily on refinement, rarely rejecting a proposal to use animals or deliberating the ethics of a proposed animal use.

IACUCs by Law

Following reports of terrible animal mistreatment in laboratories, the AWA was amended in 1985 to require each research facility to establish at least one committee, consisting of at least three members, to oversee its animal care and use program. According to the AWA, “Such members shall possess sufficient ability to assess animal care, treatment, and practices in experimental research... and shall represent society’s concerns regarding the welfare of animal subjects used at such facility.” The AWA specifically requires that at least one of the members “is intended to provide representation for general community interests in the proper care and treatment of animals.”

The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the agency charged with overseeing the AWA and establishing regulations to implement the provisions of the AWA, further requires that the member representing general community interests cannot be affiliated with the facility.

The duties of the IACUC include reviewing the research facility’s animal care and use program, inspecting the animal facilities, and, most importantly, reviewing proposals for animal...
use. An investigator cannot conduct an activity that involves the use of animals without first submitting a proposal to the IACUC and gaining approval.

A proposal to conduct an activity involving animals must contain several pieces of information: the species and number of animals to be used; a rationale for involving animals, and for using that particular species and number of animals; a complete description of the proposed use; a description of the procedures to be used to limit the animals’ discomfort and pain to that which is unavoidable for the conduct of the research; and a description of any euthanasia methods to be used.

The IACUC, in turn, must review the proposals to determine that pain, distress, and discomfort are minimized; that, for procedures that may cause more than momentary or slight pain or distress, the investigator has considered alternatives, and appropriate sedatives, analgesics, or anesthetics are used (unless the investigator provides justification for withholding such medications); and that the proposed activities are not unnecessarily duplicative of other experiments. In addition, the IACUCs are responsible for ensuring that requirements are met for the proper housing of animals in accordance with the AWA, the provision of veterinary care, pre- and post-surgical care, and training of personnel who will be conducting procedures on animals.

The regulations do not stipulate that the IACUC must weigh the costs and benefits of the proposed research project before deciding whether or not to approve the proposal.

**IACUCs in Practice**

The legislative and regulatory language used to describe an IACUC’s responsibilities appears to provide substantial opportunity for the consideration of animal welfare and the protection of animals from harmful or unnecessary procedures. However, in practice, the scope of animal welfare considerations contemplated by IACUCs tends to be more limited than what was hoped for by animal advocates.

According to a study by Barbara Orlans, one of the few investigating IACUC function, rather than discussing the justification for inflicting animal pain in the name of science, many IACUCs tend to focus on modifying anesthetic or analgesic procedures to lessen animal pain. These elements are important for improving the treatment of animals used in research and reducing some of the pain or distress they might experience. However, the focus on refinement is predicated on a mindset that there is nothing wrong with animal research per se, that it does not need to be questioned, reduced, or replaced, that it is generally acceptable as long as steps are taken to consider the “humane” treatment of the animals.

Why aren’t the central ethical and animal welfare questions surrounding animal research discussed by most IACUCs? Little research has been conducted on IACUCs in the U.S. (more attention has been paid to the issue in the European Union), but two main reasons emerge:

1. **Community representation**: Questions of ethics and animal suffering, if they are raised, are often brought forward by the IACUC’s community member. However, there are several barriers that prevent the community member from being as effective as possible.

First, even though the AWA specifically calls for “community interests in animal welfare” to be represented, this often does not occur. Many IACUCs avoid animal welfare advocates, and some even forbid their participation on the committee. Friends or neighbors of IACUC members are instead selected to serve as the community member, or sometimes ethicists or clergy members are chosen.

An IACUC chairperson interviewed as part of the Orlans study stated that having an animal welfare advocate on the committee would be “disruptive and contrary to the function of the committee.” This, again, highlights the disparities in what is seen as the function of the committee.

Further, the community member has no real way to be a community representative. S/he is not elected or nominated and has no mechanism to discuss issues with the community. In addition, the community representative has just one vote, and in most cases, only a majority is needed to approve protocols. According to Orlans, few other members besides the community representative tend to raise objections to the protocols or vote to disapprove a protocol, so the community representative is a lone, powerless voice.

2. **Focus on technical details**: Scientists, who dominate the membership of IACUCs, are more comfortable discussing the technical details of an animal use proposal than the ethical questions it raises. The resulting focus on refinement, on details of anesthetic or analgesic protocols, for example, can be considered both a success and failure of the IACUC system.

On the one hand, these scientific details have become an area where both scientists and animal welfare advocates can agree. Improving the care and treatment of animals is good for the animals, and also produces more reliable data. It is a notable achievement that consideration of animal welfare, in some form, is now a generally accepted and important element of research design.

On the other hand, conversations that revolve around minor modifications and scientific details are not amenable to broader ethical discussions. The rationale for animal use and the suitability of alternatives can receive little substantive attention. In addition, the focus on refinement sets the expectation for what the function of the IACUC is. Rather than existing to question whether a proposed research project involving animals should take place, to minimize the amount of research that
uses animals, the IACUC’s purpose tends to be to treat animal research as unquestionable but make it more humane.

**COULD IACUCS CONSIDER ETHICS?**

It would be far from unprecedented for a body such as an IACUC to consider the ethical dimensions of proposed uses of animals. Indeed, many other countries specifically require that ethics and animal welfare be considered before approval of an animal use proposal can be granted, and that the likely costs or harms to animals are weighed against the expected benefits of the work.

For example, research institutions in the UK are required to set up a local “Ethical Review Process.” Sweden has “Regional Ethics Committees.” Numerous other European countries have established some sort of mechanism for ethical review, Australia and New Zealand have “Animal Ethics Committees,” and the “Animal Care Committees” of Canada are also expected to conduct cost/benefit assessments involving “consideration of relevant ethical, scientific, and social issues.” The UK-based RSPCA has detailed information about conducting ethical reviews, and the Federation of European Laboratory Animal Science Associations (FELASA) even produced a report in 2005 on “Principles and Practice in Ethical Review of Animal Experiments Across Europe.” Some of these countries specifically require that at least one animal welfare advocate serve on the committee.

The idea behind the cost-benefit or harm-benefit assessments that are central to these ethical review systems is supported by the U.S. Government Principles for the Utilization and Care of Vertebrate Animals Used in Testing, Research, and Training. The second principle states that, “Procedures involving animals should be designed and performed with due consideration of their relevance to human or animal health, the advancement of knowledge, or the good of society.” Further, the AWA calls for IACUC representation of society’s interests and concerns regarding animal welfare.

Interestingly, many of the IACUC chairpersons interviewed as part of a study examining IACUC composition and functioning stated that “the community member's presence was to provide assurance to the community that all animal experiments were appropriate and necessary and deserved community endorsement.” Thus, even though the appropriateness, necessity, and merit of proposed animal experiments are rarely, if ever, discussed by IACUCs, there is an implicit expectation nonetheless that this occurs.

The U.S. soon may not have a choice about whether IACUCs should consider ethics. In March 2009, the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), a reference organization for the World Trade Organization (WTO) on matters related to animal health and welfare, of which the U.S. is a member country, released its Draft Proposal on the Use of Animals in Research, Testing. In the proposed standards for the regulation of animal use, the OIE included a provision for the establishment of Animal Care and Use Committees that are responsible for considering ethics, and specifically called for a harm-benefit analysis of project proposals to ensure that “the benefits should be maximised and the harms, in terms of animal use and suffering, should be minimised.”

It is worth noting, however, that, according to recent studies, even when ethics discussions and harm-benefit analyses are required by law, many barriers still exist that prevent meaningful deliberation. Even in those countries that have some sort of Animal Ethics Committee and representation of animal welfare advocates, much of the discussion still focuses on issues of refinement and fails to tackle the broader ethical issues. Also challenging is how different ethical viewpoints can be reconciled, and how harms and benefits can be weighed when different stakeholders place different emphases on the value of animal life or the value of scientific inquiry.

**CONCLUSION**

The central ethical question that surrounds animal research is whether, and how, animals can be used. IACUCs, in overseeing the animal use programs at research institutions, have focused on improving the care of the animals used—an emphasis on refinement. In doing so, IACUCs have missed an opportunity to question and reduce animal use.

Changes can be made to improve IACUCs’ consideration of ethics and animal welfare.

The USDA could clarify the purpose and function of both the IACUC and the community member, community representation could be increased, and animal welfare advocates could be sought out rather than avoided.

However, while it is critical that ethical review of research proposals be conducted, studies of animal committees demonstrate that it is still unclear what the right forum would be for the discussions. Ethics discussions within IACUCs do not necessarily work as intended. Quite possibly, ethical discussions need to take place in a completely different forum from where decisions are being made. Orlans, drawing from the history of Institutional Review Boards that oversee human research and the protections that have been won for human experimental subjects, suggests the creation of a national commission on animal experimentation issues.

A national commission, whether it be on animal experimentation in particular or animal protection in general, could spur broad dialogues on these issues and help increase public education and involvement. Ultimately, what will be needed is a greater embrace from the scientific community that animal use should be minimized and replaced.
Why Animals Deserve Special Moral Solicitude

For some of my contemporaries, it is a comparatively small thing to justify the infliction of suffering. “Animals,” they say, “are only animals.” But that dismissive line obscures the fact that animals suffer only to a greater or lesser extent than we do. There is now ample evidence in peer reviewed scientific journals that all mammals (at least) suffer not just pain, but also shock, fear, terror, anticipation, foreboding, stress, anxiety, and trauma.1

If it is true that animals can suffer in these ways which were once considered uniquely human, then it is peculiarly difficult—philosophically—to justify the deliberate infliction of suffering on animals. In addition, there are considerations here that are specifically relevant to animals, as well as some weaker humans, but they seldom receive the attention they should.

Consider: Animals cannot give or withhold their consent. Informed voluntary consent is now regarded as essential in order to justify experimentation on human subjects, but when it comes to animals, that relevant factor is always absent. Consider also: animals cannot represent or vocalise their own interests. Individuals who cannot adequately represent themselves have to depend upon others to do so. Unlike even children or the elderly who suffer from dementia, but who can be represented in a court of law, animals seldom have a spokesperson who has “legal standing” who can represent their interests, so it is precisely because they cannot articulate their needs or represent their interests that these needs are almost always ignored, and yet they should invoke a heightened sense of obligation.

Consider further: Animals are morally innocent or blameless. Because they are not moral agents with free will, they cannot—strictly speaking—be regarded as morally responsible. As C. S. Lewis rightly observed: “So far as we know beasts are incapable of sin or virtue; therefore they can neither deserve pain nor be improved by it.”2 Consider lastly: animals are vulnerable and defenceless. They are almost wholly within our power and subject to our will. Except in rare circumstances, animals pose us no threat, constitute no risk to our life, and possess no means of offence or defence. Moral solicitude should properly relate to, and be commensurate with, the relative vulnerability of the subject concerned, or what might be termed “ontologies of vulnerability.”3

The point is that these considerations, when impartially judged (or at least as impartially as humans can manage) mean that the infliction of suffering upon animals is harder, not easier, to justify. Non-consenting, inarticulate, innocent, and vulnerable beings deserve special moral solicitude.4

Now some people believe that theology can be drawn upon to justify the infliction of suffering. Theology has been central, at least historically, in providing some of the key justifications for the use of animals. But how convincing are they?

“We have dominion over animals,” it is often said. I never cease to be amazed at the number of atheists who believe that humans have dominion. For centuries, it needs to be admitted, Christians have interpreted Genesis 1 as meaning little more than “might is right”—a view that has influenced the largely secular view of
animals today. But modern scholarship has made clear how wrong we were. The priestly theology of Genesis is not that of man-the-despot but rather of humanity as the species commissioned to care, under God, for the creation. And in case this appears like liberal revisionism of an ancient text, there is internal evidence in the text itself. In Genesis 1: 26-29, humans are made in God’s image and given dominion, and in subsequent verses (29-30) given a vegetarian diet. Herb-eating dominion is hardly a license for tyranny.

“We humans are made in the image of God,” it is often said. But the God in whose image we are made is a God of love, mercy, justice. It is difficult to see how being made in that image can justify the infliction of pain whatever the motives. Indeed, modern scholarship reveals that “image” and “dominion” go together: humans are to represent God’s own benevolent care for other creatures. If one truly believes that God is benevolent and that humans are made in God’s image, then our obligations are clear: we also must be benevolent not just to other humans but to the whole of God’s creation. Humans are uniquely responsible to God for how they exercise their authority. The picture that emerges is of a God that creates humans with God-given capacities to care for creation as God’s own representative on earth. We are to be not so much the “master species” as the “servant species.”

“Only humans have souls, however.” A fact, Catholic theology has never denied that animals have souls, only that they possess rational and, therefore, immortal souls. Quite how that position squares with the Biblical vision of the redemption of all creation is for others to judge. But, even if true, the absence of a soul— as C. S. Lewis once indicated—makes the infliction of pain harder to justify:

“For it means that animals cannot deserve pain, nor profit morally by the discipline of pain, nor be recompensed by happiness in another life for suffering in this. Thus all the factors which render pain more tolerable or make it less totally evil in the case of human beings will be lacking in the beasts. “Soullessness,” in so far as it is relevant by use of their imagination. They cannot, like Terry Waite in captivity, intellectually appreciate the forces that led to their capture and begin, as he did, to write “in my imagination.” It is unclear that rational incomprehension always (to say the least) makes suffering less acute.

“Nevertheless, humans are unique and superior” it is claimed. “We have reason, free will, and we are morally accountable in a way in which animals can never be.” But it follows that it is precisely because we have those exalted capacities that we should acknowledge duties to them that they cannot acknowledge towards us. Properly understood, moral superiority can never be the basis for behaving in a morally inferior way. And here we reach the decisive consideration from a theological perspective: our power or lordship over animals needs to be related to that exercise of lordship seen in the life of Jesus Christ.

Jesus provides us with what I have called a “paradigm of inclusive moral generosity” that privileges the weak, the vulnerable, the poor, the marginalised, and the outcast. But if costly generosity really is the God-given paradigm, then it ought also be the paradigm for the exercise of human dominion over the animal world. The doctrine of the incarnation involves the sacrifice of the “higher” for the “lower,” not the reverse. And if that is the true model of divine generosity, it is difficult to see how humans can otherwise interpret their exercise of power over other sentient creatures. As I have written elsewhere:

“When we speak of human superiority, we speak of such a thing properly only and in so far as we speak not only of Christlike lordship but also of Christlike service. There can be no lordship without service and no service without lordship. Our special value in creation consists in being of special value to others.”

Now some will say that this discourse wilfully neglects what they see as the central issue: isn’t such suffering nevertheless justifiable if it serves laudable ends? Important, serious ends, like the accumulation of scientific knowledge that may help cure disease or alleviate suffering?

But a yes to that question is only readily available to those who hold to a simple kind of utilitarian philosophy, and believe (as I do not) that the ends always justify the means. If I did believe that, I would not want to stop at animals, however. If benefits can justify the infliction of suffering on animals, they should also logically justify the use of weaker human subjects. After all, the results would be more applicable, more certain. That this is the case is recognised even by those who fully support animal experimentation. The philosopher Raymond Frey writes that “...we cannot, with the appeal to benefit, justify (painful) animal experiments without justifying (painful) human experiments.” That we do not (usually) justify painful experiments on humans without their permission shows precisely what our ethics includes and where it stops, and yet this “boundary line” is arbitrary.

“But we have to experiment on animals because we can’t experiment on humans,” it is claimed. In fact, animal experimentation has not prevented experimentation on humans: alongside the use of animals, vulnerable human subjects such as: children, prisoners of war, Jews, people of colour, the mentally challenged, even ordinary soldiers have been used in experimentation without their knowledge or informed consent, or both. And some of us are still disturbed that experiments on human embryos are permissible up to 14 days in the United Kingdom—to which we shall shortly have to add the phenomenon of animal-human hybrids. To those who once claimed that we must choose between “your dog or your baby,” we need to remind ourselves of the counter-claim made by early anti-vivisectionists: it is not a choice between “your dog or your baby” but rather “your dog and your baby. It is not a question of animals or human beings, but one of animals and human beings.”
The foregoing has outlined some of the grounds for regarding the infliction of suffering on non-consenting, inarticulate, innocent, and vulnerable creatures as intrinsically wrong. I am always rather bemused when people talk about “emotional arguments” for animals, when in truth the purely rational case is one of the strongest in ethics. It seems to me that one can justify painful experimentation only if one can find clear rational grounds for saying that human interests are always and absolutely primary. Accepting that it may be sometimes right to choose in the interests of humans is one thing; believing that we are justified in creating an institution that routinely uses and abuses animals is another. 

REFERENCES:
3 I am grateful to Professor Dan Robinson of Georgetown University for this term.
11 The key text here is Susan E. Lederer (1995), Subjected to Science: Human Experimentation in America before the Second World War. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. It is clear from the book that Lederer is not herself an anti-vivisectionist; indeed she is not wholly unfavourable to both experimentation on human as well as animal subjects. All the more remarkable, then, that one of her documented claims is that “During this period [before the Second World War], the moral issues raised by experimenting on human beings were most intensely pursued by men and women committed to the protection of animals. Already devoted to saving dogs, cats, and other animals from the vivisector’s knife, anti-vivisectionists warned that the replacement of the family physician by the ‘scientists by the bedside’ would inspire non-therapeutic experimentation on vulnerable human beings.” Again: “Human vivisection must be understood in the larger context of animal protection,” pp. xiv and xv. Taken from Andrew Linzey (1994). Animal Gospel. London: Hodder and Stoughton, and Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, pp. 92-8.

The Revd Professor Andrew Linzey, Ph.D., DD is Director of the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics (www.oxfordanimalethics.com) and a member of the Faculty of Theology, University of Oxford. He is also Honorary Professor at the University of Winchester, and the Henry Bergh Professor of Animal Ethics at the Graduate Theological Foundation, Indiana.

This article is a revised version of the University Sermon preached at the University Church, Oxford, on 17 February, 2008. The author would like to thank Canon Vincent Strudwick and Professor Priscilla Cohn for their comments on an earlier draft.

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Suffer the animals....
By Julie Cooper-Fratrik

Why Animal Suffering Matters: Philosophy, Theology, and Practical Ethics by Andrew Linzey

In his newest book, Why Animal Suffering Matters, eminent animal theologian and activist Andrew Linzey, Director of the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics, presents his readers with several cogent and persuasive arguments as to why animal suffering matters, and matters deeply.

His book is a direct response to those who continue to insist that issues relating to the current treatment of animals are based wholly on emotion rather than reason and that, by implication, there are no rational grounds for concerning oneself with such issues.

Many people argue that because human and non-human animals are different from each other, animals do not have the same rights as humans and may be treated differently—that is, mistreated. Linzey examines these differences and then argues perspicuously that it is these differences rather than the similarities between human and non-human animals that persuade us that we must grant animals special care: it is because they are vulnerable, cannot speak for themselves (at least not in language as humans understand it), and cannot represent their own interests and needs that we have certain obligations toward their well-being. Although Linzey’s arguments arise from a basis in Christian theology and ethics, they are no less persuasive for non-believers such as this reviewer.

This is simply the beginning, however; Linzey covers a gamut of philosophical arguments, both contemporary and historic, that are as easy for laypersons to understand as they are for philosophers. He combines these arguments with interesting information on the history of the animal rights movement. He summarizes each chapter’s main ideas and arguments, and addresses possible objections one might raise. His style is eminently satisfying; this is an enjoyable book to read.

Not only animal suffering—but all suffering—matters deeply to Linzey. It is never all right, he insists, for someone to deliberately cause suffering to a sentient being, a philosophy that perhaps we would all do well to embrace as our own. Why Animal Suffering Matters is, finally, a compassionate and most important book.
The technical possibility that scientists could create an animal that feels no physical pain at all prompted myself and Alan Goldberg, the Founding Director Emeritus and Professor of the Center for Alternatives to Animal Testing at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, to wonder what place, if any, a pain-free animal would have in a biomedical laboratory.

We surveyed about 250 people, including scientists and members of the animal welfare community, on this topic. Our survey began with simple questions about whether participants agreed with the use of animals in medical experiments. Results were predictable: scientists were more likely to be in favor of it, and members of the animal protection community were more likely to be against it. Also, the number of people who were in favor of animal experimentation went down dramatically when the question explicitly mentioned that the laboratory animals might feel pain or distress during the experiment. Historically, it is the case that the more pain that is involved in an experiment, the more likely it is that the experiment will be rejected, either in polls of public opinion or by governing bodies such as an Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (IACUC) or ethics committee. Does that mean that experiments using animals who couldn’t feel pain would be more acceptable?

The majority of respondents, from all backgrounds, disagreed that such a pain-free animal ought to be created in the first place. Yet if a pain-free animal were already available for the scientist to use in an experiment, many people, including the majority of those in the animal protection community, said a scientist would be morally obligated to use it rather than an animal who felt pain. The vast majority of participants also felt strongly that scientists should not be allowed to conduct any experiment using pain-free animals without oversight or restriction.

The U.S. Animal Welfare Act (AWA) requires that scientists do all they can to minimize pain and distress in experimental animals. The level of justification required to gain approval from an IACUC for an experiment correlates most directly with the amount of pain caused to experimental animals and whether this pain is relieved. Distress is not defined by the AWA and is generally assumed to correlate with the level of pain; distress is rarely mentioned outside this context, although distress can clearly occur independently of pain.

Pain alone is not what dictates the ethical beliefs of most people about the use of animals in laboratories. The internal, emotional status of the animal is also important. The responses and comments we received indicate that most participants recognize an intrinsic value in animals, and that this value extends to the mouse in a laboratory. The creation of an animal who does not feel pain opens up a greater potential for abuse: an animal who could not feel pain in the laboratory seems to be in danger of being viewed as nothing more than a complicated piece of laboratory equipment. Participants from all different backgrounds uniformly rejected the view that animals ought to be treated this way.
Caring for Animals: A Feminist Approach

Beginning in the 1980s, feminist theorists developed a feminist approach—based on care and interspecies communication—to the issue of the moral status of animals, or what is now termed “animal ethics.” The feminist approach was rooted in “ethic-of-care” theory, as articulated primarily in Carol Gilligan’s celebrated In A Different Voice (1982). Gilligan identified a women’s “conception of morality” as one that is “concerned with the activity of care…responsibility and relationships,” as opposed to one more concerned with “rights and rules” and an abstract idea of justice.

The women’s approach offered a more flexible, situational, and particularized ethic, one that showed a concern with “sustaining connection…keeping the web of relationships intact.”

The feminist care approach to animal ethics applies these ideas to the human-animal relationship, calling for a situational ethic of care and responsibility. As with feminism in general, care theory rejects hierarchical dominative dualisms, which establish the powerful (humans, males, whites) over the subordinate (animals, women, people of color). Instead, care theorists see all living creatures as having value and as embedded in an interdependent matrix.

In applying the feminist care ethic to animals, theorists argued that while natural rights theory makes important contributions to theorizing about animals, it nevertheless is in many ways inadequate and unworkable when applied to animals. One problem is that it requires the claim that animals are in many respects similar to humans, that they are autonomous individuals who have an intelligence that is similar to human reason, and therefore are entitled to rights. While animals undoubtedly have highly developed forms of intelligence, it is a stretch to equate them with rational, property-owning men, the original rights-holders.

We therefore need an ethic that acknowledges that nonhuman animals are different, are not in fact human, but are nevertheless entitled to moral respect. Care theory argues that we have a moral responsibility toward all creatures with whom we can communicate, regardless of how different they may be from us.

Rights theory also presumes a society of equal autonomous agents, who require little support from others, who need only that their space be protected from others’ intrusions. But, in reality, animals are not equal to humans; domestic animals, in particular, are for the most part dependent for survival upon humans. We therefore have a situation of unequals, and need an ethic that recognizes this fact. Rights theory has in fact been criticized by feminists when applied to humans because its vision of the equal, autonomous individual (male) ignores the network of supporting persons (usually female) who enable his autonomy; that is, who raise him, feed him, clothe him, etc. In short, rights theory ignores the fact that most humans and animals operate within an interdependent network, and it provides no obligation to care for those who are unable to operate autonomously.

Another problem feminists have had with the rights approach is that it devalues, suppresses, or denies the emotions. This means that a major basis for the human-animal connection—love—is not encompassed. Since the exclusion of the emotional response is a major reason why animal abuse and exploitation continue, it seems contradictory for animal defense advocates to also claim that feelings are inappropriate guides to ethical treatment.

The feminist ethic of care sees animals as individuals who do have feelings, who can communicate those feelings, and to whom therefore humans have moral obligations. An ethic of care also recognizes the diversity of animals; one size doesn’t fit all; each has a particular history. Insofar as possible, attention needs to be paid to these particularities in any ethical determination regarding them.

One of the primary theories that continues to legitimize animal abuse is Cartesian dualism—the division of the world into mind and matter. In the Cartesian view, matter is assumed to be lifeless and without energizing spirit (unlike in much premodern thinking, which is animist), and is held therefore to be of lesser value than
mind, spirit, or reason. In this viewpoint, which undergirds much modern thinking about animals, which is instrumental, animals are reduced to mere things, machine-like automats lacking inner spirit, sensitivity, or feelings. It is this theory that legitimizes vivisection and factory farming, for example, and, as Thomas Kelch has pointed out, it is this view that supports the current common law conception of animals as property. Kelch argues for reconceptualizing the moral status of animals as feeling subjects, which he believes will lead to changing the legal status of animals.

The feminist care approach therefore pays attention (a key word in feminist ethic-of-care theorizing) to the individual suffering animal but also to the political and economic systems that are causing the suffering. The feminist care approach in short recognizes the importance of each individual animal while also developing a more comprehensive analysis of why the animal is being abused in the first place.

Care theory recognizes that ideological systems often screen humans from animal harm and suffering by offering legitimizing rationalization for those harms, as a number of theorists, notably Brian Luke, Kenneth Shapiro, and Carol J. Adams, have emphasized. Men especially, Luke and Shapiro note, are socialized from an early age under our “sex-species system” (Adams’s term) to consider sympathy and compassion for animals as unmanly and feminine, which Adams sees as one aspect of a more general derision of compassion in society at large. Animal harm is moreover rendered invisible for most people, as Luke notes, by massive ideological screening that allows people not to see the suffering animal in the laboratory or slaughterhouse.

Recently, some ethic-of-care theorists have proposed that our attention should be directed as well to what the animals are telling us, rather than what other humans are telling us about them. In an article “Caring to Dialogue,” I have called for a renewed emphasis on dialogue with animals, learning their communication systems, reading their body language phenomenologically, and taking these communications seriously in our ethical decisions.

Such communication may be imperfect. It may indeed be impossible to really know, as Thomas Nagel famously put it, “what it is like to be a bat” (1974). But we can nevertheless decipher animal communications sufficiently to formulate an appropriate ethical response. Indeed, we use the same mental and emotional operations in reading an animal as we do a human. Body language, eye movement, facial expression, tone of voice all are important signs. One might in fact argue that nonhuman animals’ emotional responses are more clear and direct than humans’ and thus are easier to read. In reading animals, it is sometimes helpful to know about species’ habits and culture. And as with humans, repeated experiences with one individual help one to understand that individual’s unique needs and wishes.

One of the principal ways by which one understands animal “language” sympathetically is by analogy to one’s own experience. If a dog is yelping, whining, leaping about, and licking an open cut; and since, under similar circumstances, I know I would likewise be (or feel like) crying and moving about anxiously because of the pain, I therefore conclude that the animal is experiencing the same kind of pain as I would, and that s/he doesn’t like it. Knowing that one would wish one’s own pain to be alleviated, one is moved to do the same for the animal. Of course, the animal’s expressed feelings or wishes cannot always be determined. At times, humans may have to override them for their own good (as when one vaccinates one’s companion animal). And to be sure, the more different the creature is from oneself the more difficult the communication. But even insects, fishes, reptiles, and birds react in ways we can relate to: avoiding pain and what threatens death, and seeking what enhances their life.

If, in short, we really begin to pay attention to what other creatures are telling us, we will hear that they do not want to be slaughtered, eaten, subjected to pain, or treated instrumentally as feelingless objects. It behooves us humans as ethical beings to incorporate their wishes when we make decisions—as we inevitably must—about their lives.

Josephine Donovan, Professor Emerita at the University of Maine, has written widely on literature and animal ethics: most recently, with Carol J. Adams, she edited The Feminist Care Tradition in Animal Ethics (Columbia University Press, 2007). Parts of this essay are derived from the introduction. A longer version appeared in Tikkun (Jan.-Feb. 2009).
Exploiting Animals: A Philosophical Protest

Human ethical practices and attitudes with respect to the other animals exhibit a curious instability. On the one hand, most people believe that it is wrong to inflict suffering or death on a non-human animal for a trivial reason. On the other hand, we have traditionally felt free to make use of the other animals for our own purposes, and we have treated any use we may have for them, or any obstacle they present to our ends, as a sufficient reason to hurt or kill them.

We kill non-human animals, and sometimes inflict pain on them, because we want to eat them, because we can make useful products out of them, because we can learn from experimenting on them, and because they interfere with agriculture or gardening or in other ways are pests. We also kill them, and sometimes inflict pain on them, for sport in hunting, fishing, cockfighting, dogfighting, and bullfighting. We may even kill them because, having done some sort of useful work for us, they have outlived their usefulness and are now costing us money.

What, if anything, could justify the way we treat the other animals? What gives us the right to hurt or kill them? And what gives us the right to treat them as mere means or obstacles to human ends?

From the time of the Enlightenment up to the present, the study of ethics has been dominated by two major traditions of philosophy. Those in the utilitarian tradition, originating in the work of Jeremy Bentham in the late eighteenth century and John Stuart Mill in the nineteenth, believe that the right action is the one which does the most good, where “doing the most good” includes importantly, if not exclusively, maximizing the amount of happiness and pleasure and minimizing the amount of misery and pain in the world. Unsurprisingly, philosophers in the utilitarian tradition have been champions of the extension of moral concern to the other animals, and have done important work in the world to promote that cause. If the point of moral conduct is to maximize happiness and minimize misery, surely there is no reason why we should not include the pleasures and pains of the other animals when we tally up the consequences of our actions. Utilitarians have argued that much of the suffering we inflict on animals when we make use of them for our own purposes is unnecessary and so wrong by their standard. But there is a further question, one that the utilitarians haven’t raised. Why should we have the right to make use of them at all?

Those in the older tradition deriving from the work of Immanuel Kant in the 18th century argue for a very different conception of what is morally required...
of us and why.” At the center of Kantian ethics is the idea that every human being is an “end-in-himself” who is never to be exploited as a mere means to another person’s ends. The idea has found its way into our moral culture: “You are just using me!” is one of our most familiar forms of moral protest. That each of us necessarily regards himself as an end-in-himself, Kant argued, shows up in the simple fact that we choose to pursue the things that we believe are good for us as if they were good absolutely. We treat our own good and that of our loved ones as something objectively valuable, as something that there is reason to pursue. We also demand of others that they should respect our right to pursue it, consistent with a similar right for all, and that they should be willing to help us when we are in need. It is as if each of us said to herself, “The things that matter to me are important, because I am important; what happens to me matters, because I do.” Then seeing that others are in the same position as we are, we accord the same moral standing to them.

Should we also treat the other animals as ends-in-themselves? Before we ask that question, we must raise another, which is whether it is even possible for us to do so. Kant’s injunction forbids using another as “mere” means, not using another as a means at all. Human beings use each other as means, in the sense that we avail ourselves of each other’s services, all the time. According to Kant, what makes the difference between exploiting someone as a “mere” means, and using him as a means in a way that is morally permissible, is whether you have his informed and uncoerced consent. We serve each other’s interests, consenting to do so, from motives of profit, love, friendship, or a general spirit of cooperation. But the other animals cannot give us their informed and uncoerced consent.

But this hardly means we have no option except to exploit them. We could still undertake to interact with them in ways to which we think they would consent if they could in ways that are mutually beneficial and fair. What would this permit? If we provide them with comfortable living conditions, in which they are able to lead something reasonably like their own sort of life, their use as companion animals can probably be justified. It is possible that their use as aides to the handicapped and to the police, search and rescue workers, and guards, can also be justified, if those tasks can be made compatible with a comfortable and natural life. Whether they could consent to provide us with wool, dairy products, or eggs, depends on whether there are methods of gathering those products that are genuinely compatible with a normal and happy life for the animals. Factory farming violates that condition in a scandalous way, but we can at least raise the question whether there is any mode of farming that does not. But to be hunted for sport, killed before their time in order to serve us as food, or subjected to painful medical experiments, are things to which we cannot plausibly say we would consent if we could.

Assuming that we can do so, should we treat the other animals as ends-in-themselves? Kant believed that moral concern is properly limited to rational beings, who are in a position to demand respect from one another. But what this leaves out is that what we demand, when we demand respect from one another, is that our natural concerns—the objects of our natural desires and interests and affections—be accorded the status of objective values, values that must be respected as far as possible by others. And many of those natural concerns—the desire to avoid pain is an obvious example—spring from our animal nature, not from our rational nature, and are concerns we share with the other animals. So while it is our rational nature that enables us to value ourselves and each other as ends-in-ourselves, what we value, what we take to be an end-in-itself, includes our animal nature as well as our rational nature.3

There is a more general, if more controversial, way to put this point. We are ourselves animals, who evolved on this planet along with the other animals. Like every animal, we have certain desires and interests that are given to us by our nature, as well as those we have developed through culture and education. Like every animal, we pursue the satisfaction of our desires and interests and those of our loved ones as if it were an urgent matter. Unlike the other animals, we do this consciously and of our own free choice. We do not just pursue the fulfillment of our interests; we consciously value the fulfillment of our interests, and demand that others do so as well. The other animals, or so I believe, do not do that. And yet they do pursue their own interests as an urgent matter, for it is the very nature of an animal to do that. That, in a way, is what an animal essentially is, a being that actively pursues his or her own health and survival, and, in various ways, that of his or her offspring. To that extent, the other animals are in the same position as ourselves: they are animate beings, with an urgent concern, given to them by nature, to look after their own interests and the interests of those to whom they are attached. That natural concern is the origin of all value: there are things in this world that are good and bad, precisely because there are creatures for whom things can be good or bad. Those who share that natural concern for themselves and their families therefore share the feature of our nature for which we demand respect. They, like us, are beings for whom things can be good or bad. The other animals therefore have a claim both on our reason and on our feelings of solidarity. We should therefore respect them as ends-in-themselves.

REFERENCES


We see two major trends regarding ethics in academia: first, the inquiry which started in philosophy departments has expanded into other disciplines, so that there exists today the growing and increasingly robust field of Human-Animal Studies in the social sciences and humanities, and of animal law in law schools, and even in disciplines that traditionally view animals as instrumentalities. Second, many of the scholars who consider these issues from an academic perspective are also involved in practical applications of their theories, typical of other academic disciplines that are grounded in social justice movements (namely, ethnic, women’s, and environmental studies).

While issues of ethics and animals have occupied philosophers since at least classical times, this inquiry was on the periphery of the discipline, and the social ethic generally prohibited only the most egregious forms of animal cruelty and neglect. With Peter Singer’s 1975 *Animal Liberation*, followed by Tom Regan’s *The Case for Animal Rights*, there has been an explosion of interest in animals among academics, animal advocates, and the general public. We position the rise of Human-Animal Studies (HAS) in academia, especially over the last decade, squarely within the context of considering animals as worthy of ethical inquiry.

Human-Animal Studies is a rapidly growing interdisciplinary field that examines the complex and multidimensional relationships between humans and other animals. HAS comprises work in such areas as psychology, sociology, anthropology, political science, history, literary criticism, as well as philosophy. By focusing on the relationships between human and animal, HAS scholarship allows non-human animals to become true subjects worthy of consideration rather than simple objects.

While activism to better the lives of animals is not a key component of human-animal studies, many HAS scholars are themselves advocates. Although standards have been changing, traditionally, academic inquiry was supposed to be value-free in its pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. Thus, disciplines related to social justice movements, including HAS, were undervalued as not being sufficiently objective or rigorous. More recent thinking, however, acknowledges that even scientific research is never truly objective. The selection of topics to study and the structure of the study itself are value-laden. Even still, HAS scholars, many of whom were attracted to the field precisely because of their passion for animals, often wrestle with the competing interests of establishing themselves academically while applying acquired knowledge outside the “ivory tower” in order to improve the lives of animals. A growing number of scholars have found a middle ground doing rigorous research, some of which now forms the basis of more progressive policies related to our interaction with, and even use of, animals.

Outside the humanities and social science courses, veterinary schools and even those who experiment on animals or use them in agricultural science now at least pay lip service to ethical considerations regarding their use of animals by having animal welfare specialists on staff and teaching courses on ethical issues.

Therefore, we are cautiously optimistic about the future development of ethical consideration of animals in academic pursuits. Many of the pioneers of HAS began their careers when these concerns were not even on the radar screen, but today, increasingly, students enter academia not only cognizant of the ethics of the human-animal relationship, but committed to making this their life’s work. We envision a future in which these scholars, fully ensconced in academia, are better positioned to openly engage in ethical discussions, political engagement, and challenges to speciesism.
2009 ALTERNATIVES GRANTS ADVANCE NEW MODELS

As AAVS tackles the ethical problems with animal research, its affiliate, the Alternatives Research & Development Foundation (ARDF), tackles the practical scientific issues of finding new, non-animal models for research. The keystone activity is the annual Alternatives Research Grant Program, which awards grants to scientists who can demonstrate that steering research away from animal use results in better, more relevant methods.

For the 2009 grant cycle, ARDF’s peer reviews were coordinated by Rodger Curren, Ph.D. and his team at the Institute for In Vitro Sciences, helping identify the most promising projects.

ARDF is pleased to announce the grant recipients for 2009:

**Douglas S. Clark, Ph.D.**  
*University of California – Berkeley, Berkeley, CA*  
**Cellular and Enzymatic Microarrays to Reduce the Use of Animals in Toxicology Studies**

Dr. Clark’s team proposes to develop and validate an *in vitro* system for toxicity testing that improves accuracy and speed, on a scale appropriate for early stage drug discovery and initial chemical screening programs. Dr. Clark, with collaborators at other institutions, has previously developed a miniaturized 3D cell-culture array (the DataChip) that is used with a complimentary human metabolizing enzyme-containing microarray (the MetaChip) to predict the toxicity of compounds and their metabolites. The current project would refine the MetaChip/DataChip test system to eliminate any animal-derived components, and would then validate the assay by testing 50 model compounds with known qualities and comparing the results. Dr. Clark’s team will also alter components of the MetaChip/DataChip so that it can identify compounds that are also toxic to mitochondria, providing valuable information that improves the test’s ability to predict toxicity.

**Maria P. Lambros, Ph.D.**  
*Western University of Health Sciences, Pomona, CA*  
**A 3-Dimensional Human Cell Culture Model as a Replacement of Animal Models in the Study of Human Mucositis**

Cancer patients undergoing radiation or chemotherapy often experience mucositis, the inflammation and ulceration of the mucous membranes lining the mouth and gastrointestinal tract. To study mucositis, mice, rats, and hamsters are often subjected to irradiation of their tongues or snouts or to chemotherapy to induce this painful condition. As an alternative, Dr. Lambros’ team will use a 3D human cell culture model to measure the effect of irradiation on the condition of the cells, cell survival, gene expression, and presence of inflammation. Dr. Lambros hopes to demonstrate that this treated cell culture can be used as a stand-alone model to study the effects of mucositis and develop effective treatments.

**Warren E. Rose, Pharm.D.**  
*University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI*  
**Evaluation of an In Vitro Pharmacodynamic Model as an Alternative to Animal Models in Assessing Bacterial Virulence and Toxins**

*Staphylococcus aureus* is a highly virulent bacteria that causes various infectious diseases, including skin infections, pneumonia, and meningitis. These conditions are often induced in animals, typically mice and rats, to study the effects of antibiotic treatment, which can either inhibit or promote toxin production. Some *in vitro* models exist, but it is currently not possible to use them in advanced stages of testing with clinically relevant doses of antibiotics. Dr. Rose’s team proposes to address this gap by using an *in vitro* two-compartment hollow-fiber bioreactor to measure the effect of antibiotics and antibiotic combinations on toxin production to predict treatment outcomes.

**James R. Stone, Ph.D.**  
*Massachusetts General Hospital, Boston, MA*  
**Development of a Human Artery Model of Atherosclerosis**

Atherosclerosis, the build up of plaque in arteries, can lead to heart attack and stroke and is the leading cause of death in the U.S. Most research into the disease is conducted using animals, primarily mice. However, in addition to the ethical problems with using animals, mice do not develop atherosclerosis the same way humans do and often fail to predict which drugs will be effective in humans. Dr. Stone’s team aims to create an advanced *in vitro* system using intact cultured human arteries, readily obtained from surgical waste, which are then co-cultured with human monocytes and lipoproteins to recreate key elements in the development of the disease. The *in vitro* system is expected to more closely model both the unique structure of human arteries and the pathology of atherosclerosis. The model will be validated by testing the effects of currently available drugs.
Former CEO Admits Animal Cloning Is Experimental

A U.S. biotech company that offered commercial dog cloning services is closing its doors after failing to prevent an overseas rival from offering cloned dogs as well. BioArts had insisted that it owned the sole, worldwide rights to clone dogs, cats, and endangered species, and called RNL Bio in Seoul, South Korea “black-market cloners.” However, in ending the business, Lou Hawthorne, CEO of BioArts, also admitted that due to the “physical anomalies” he observed in his cloned puppies, cloning is a service that is “not ready for prime time.” Said Hawthorne, “...cloning is still an experimental technology and consumers would be well-advised to proceed cautiously.” AAVS’s No Pet Cloning campaign, launched in 2004, confronted Hawthorne with these same issues, which he denied at the time.

Meanwhile, in Seoul, South Korea, debunked scientist Hwang Woo-Suk may face jail time for his fraudulent studies on human stem cells. Hwang had been the only South Korean scientist authorized to conduct research using human stem cells. When he was stripped of this privilege, he moved to animal cloning and created the world’s first cloned dog, an Afghan hound named Snuppy. BioArts had worked with Dr. Hwang Woo-Suk.

Cloning is a cruel and inefficient process that devalues animal life. Nearly 99 percent of cloning attempts fail, instead causing death, deformities, and severe health problems to the animals involved. In fact, one of the world’s first cloned wolves, raised at Seoul National University in South Korea and aptly named Snuwolf, recently died of unknown causes. Although wild wolves can reach anywhere from 10 to 15 years of age, Snuwolf died at 46 months.

REACH May Require More Animal Use

Implemented two years ago, REACH (Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of Chemicals) aims to assess the toxicity of all chemicals sold in Europe in quantities greater than one tonne per year. However, two toxicologists reported in a recent Nature article that the number of animals and euros required to fulfill these chemical testing regulations in the European Union (EU) is set to spiral above original estimates.

The original costs were based on data from 1991 to 1994, but a lot has changed since then. For instance, amendments to the final legislation were made before it was implemented, and the EU is now comprised of 27 member states (in addition to three non-EU countries that adhere to REACH standards), instead of only 12 that were members in 1994. For these and many other reasons, researchers at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health in Maryland are convinced that complying with REACH may use 20 times more animals and cost six times as much as previously estimated.

Thomas Hartung, Director of the Center for Alternatives to Animal Testing at the Bloomberg School of Public Health, and his co-author Costanza Rovinda argue for a suspension of certain toxicity tests until alternatives are approved. “As a toxicologist, I support the aims of REACH—it is the biggest investment into consumer safety ever,” said Hartung. “However, I am concerned that we have underestimated the scale of the challenge. Investment into developing alternative research methods to meet REACH goals is urgently needed.”

Hartung and Rovinda base their new estimates on, among other things, the pre-registration of chemicals, a requirement of REACH that ended in 2008. According to their report, it was expected that 27,000 companies would submit 180,000 pre-registrations on 29,000 substances. In reality, however, 65,000 companies submitted over 2.7 million pre-registrations for more than 140,000 substances. By the team’s calculations, the “best case” number of animals used to fulfill REACH requirements will be 54 million, while the “worst case” scenario estimates 141 million animals used. The original EU figure was 2.6 million animals.

The authors are pushing for investment in alternatives and a similar strategy to one recently developed by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, which called for more non-animal in vitro methods. “There is no alternative to REACH,” said Hartung, “but there will be no REACH without alternatives.”

Artificial Lung Uses Human Tissue

A new alternative could replace the use of countless animals used in inhalation studies for cosmetics, drugs, and other chemicals. In fact, the method is already being used in trial studies by companies such as Unilever and AstraZeneca, and was widely received at the Cheltenham Festival of Science in the United Kingdom. The next step is regulatory acceptance, which is often a slow and arduous process, but cell biologist and lead researcher from Cardiff
University Dr. Kelly BéruBé believes that this model is more relevant to the human condition because it uses actual human tissues.

The Microlung uses human lung cells grown on plastic scaffolding in layers that resemble the inner lining of lungs. The cells are coaxied to grow around the surface of tiny plastic spheres, essentially producing a small, inside-out lung around each bead. When cells are allowed to grow this way, in three dimensions rather than on one plane, they arrange themselves differently, which changes the way they react to chemicals. Thus, the Microlung more naturally mimics the functioning of human lungs than other non-animal methods.

This method allows multiple chemicals to be screened at once, streamlining the testing process in addition to saving animal lives. Traditionally, anywhere from 200 - 3,000 rats or mice are used to screen one chemical. In a type of test called “nose-only” exposure, an animal is placed in a plastic device not much bigger than her body and forced to breathe in noxious substances. Unlike humans, rats can breathe only through their noses, which is notable, considering that rats are chosen to model the human respiratory system.

While the Microlung is already a boon to the research industry, the ultimate goal is to develop a chip on which thousands of microlungs can be grown and tested simultaneously. The number of animal lives that could potentially be spared is astounding.

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**Montcalm County, MI Ends Contract with Class B Dealer**

The people of Montcalm County, Michigan rejoiced this summer when the Board of Commissioners voted 6 to 3 in favor of ending the county’s contract with R&R Research, a random source Class B animal dealer. The contract was officially up on August 1, 2009.

R&R Research had received animals from the county shelter, who were then sold to research institutions in exchange for providing free disposal of the shelter’s euthanized dogs and cats. This process of releasing shelter animals to Class B dealers is known as pound seizure, and it is required in Minnesota, Oklahoma, and Utah. Other states, such as Michigan, allow it, and several have no law either way, leaving the matter up to local jurisdictions.

The end of this contract is a great victory for animals in Montcalm County, Michigan. In addition to the inherent cruelties involved in pound seizure, R&R Research is a noted violator of the Animal Welfare Act. The business has been cited for failure to provide safe and structurally sound enclosures to house and transport animals. In addition, R&R Research has been cited several times for illegally obtaining animals, including 18 cats who were obtained from Howard City (Michigan) Municipal Services, which is not licensed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture nor operating as a public pound or shelter.

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**Animal Experiments on the Rise in UK**

Statistics revealed this year by the British Home Office show that the number of animal experiments in the United Kingdom (UK) greatly increased in 2008. Collectively, the number of animal experiments rose by 454,000, or 14 percent, to a grand total of nearly 3.7 million. This is the greatest increase in animals used for medical research in the UK since 1986 when new auditing procedures were introduced.

The vast majority of animals used were mice, rats, other rodents, and fish, who make up 97 percent of all experimental subjects in the UK. Mice are commonly used in genetic engineering tests, which rose by 19 percent, and the total number of individual mice used was 2.4 million. Comparatively, in the U.S., such detailed information is not as freely available. Breakdowns by type of test can be obtained only through Freedom of Information Act requests, and total numbers are unavailable because certain species (rats, mice, and birds who are bred for research, and all fish) are not covered by the Animal Welfare Act and thus are not counted in U.S. statistics. The most recent reports from 2007 show that over 1 million covered animals were used in U.S. experiments, but estimates of total animal use range as high as 100 million.

Despite the fact that Great Britain bans the use of great apes in medical research, the total number of primates used in experiments rose seven percent because more macaques and marmosets were used in their place. Ironically, researchers contend that more pre-clinical testing in primates is required after a 2006 clinical trial in London turned to tragedy. As six trial participants received an antibody drug that had previously been tested on primates, all experienced widespread organ failure and nearly died.

Although the number of animal experiments continues to rise each year, this particular report is truly shocking given the fact that more and more alternatives are available each year, which, in the end, are safer for both humans and animals alike.
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: 

Animalearn Commends Archdiocese of Philadelphia on its Model Student Choice Policy
Archbishop Wood Graduate Awarded 2009 Humane Student of the Year

PHILADELPHIA, PA – October 5, 2009- This fall, thousands of students in 20 Archdiocese of Philadelphia high schools will benefit from a policy revision that will allow students with concerns about traditional animal dissection to use alternatives instead in science class. Students will be achieving this with the help of a national animal protection group.

According to Ms. Mary E. Rochford, Superintendent of Schools for the Archdiocese of Philadelphia, “As the 21st century evolves, greater use of virtual dissection experiences will be encouraged and eventually replace the use of scientifically preserved animals.” Ms. Rochford adds, “With the availability of virtual lab experiences and other internet instructional tools, students can arrive at the same learning.”

According to Laura Ducceschi, Director of Animalearn, “The Archdiocese’s student choice policy can serve as a model for other schools in the state of Pennsylvania, in addition to other dioceses across the U.S.” Ducceschi added, “Students attending Archdiocesan schools can borrow alternatives to dissection from Animalearn’s free loan program, The Science Bank. We will make available copies of The Science Bank catalogue to use as a resource to every biology classroom in the Archdiocese.”

Animalearn is also awarding its 2009 Annual Humane Student of the Year to Megan Sweeney, an animal-lover and recent graduate of Archbishop Wood High School, in Warminster. Ms. Sweeney followed her conscience and opted for an alternative assignment instead of dissecting animals in her biology class. The award includes a gift of dissection alternatives, including models and CD-ROMs for her alma mater.

Animalearn’s newly re-designed website, www.Animalearn.org, now offers a searchable database of over 450 alternatives to dissection, downloadable software, and other humane science tools, along with a new and improved search engine, simplifying the process for locating humane alternatives for students and teachers. A completely free resource to students and teachers nationwide, The Science Bank offers interactive models, videos, and virtual dissection CD-ROMs and DVDs.
The Leaping Bunny Program, administered by the Coalition for Consumer Information on Cosmetics (CCIC), is pleased to announce a new partnership with Naturity LLC, a company dedicated to manufacturing products without the use of animal testing.

Last month, Naturity became one of over 250 cosmetic, personal care, and household product companies in the United States and Canada that have pledged to eliminate all new animal testing from their product lines by joining the Leaping Bunny Program, the only cruelty-free certification program that compassionate consumers can truly trust. In addition, Naturity has pledged to donate 10% of the sales of its products purchased through www.LeapingBunny.org.

“We are thrilled to work with companies like Naturity that are going above and beyond to end animal testing,” said CCIC Chair Sue Leary. “By becoming a Leaping Bunny partner, Naturity has committed not only to prevent needless animal testing for its own products but also to help educate consumers and companies alike about the importance of manufacturing products with compassion.”

“Naturity is excited about working with the Leaping Bunny Program,” remarked Naturity Managing Member Anysia Kiel. “Now consumers can purchase great personal care products and help eliminate animal testing at the same time.”

(Natality LLC is dedicated to manufacturing products without animal testing and helping to eliminate animal testing at the same time.)

Student Honored for Refusing to Dissect

Animalearn’s 2009 Humane Student of the Year winner Megan Sweeney was highlighted in a local Philadelphia suburb newspaper for taking a stand against dissection. While a senior at Catholic high school Archbishop Wood in Warminster, Pennsylvania, Megan opted to use an alternative instead of participating in animal dissection classroom exercises, and was awarded by Animalearn, receiving a gift of dissection alternatives, which she donated to her alma mater.

Other students like Megan can now also choose to not dissect, thanks to a new student choice policy implemented by the Archdiocese of Philadelphia, which allows pupils who have ethical concerns with animal dissection to use state-of-art, high tech alternatives instead.

Laura Ducceschi, Director of Animalearn, which helped facilitate the policy, praised the move.

“The Archdiocese’s student choice policy can serve as a model for other schools in the state of Pennsylvania, in addition to other dioceses across the U.S.,” she said.

Mary E. Rochford, Superintendent of Schools for the Archdiocese was also quoted in the article, and gave high praise for alternatives. “As the 21st century evolves, greater use of virtual dissection experiences will be encouraged and eventually replace the use of scientifically preserved animals.” Rochford added that “students can arrive at the same learning” while using alternatives.

Rachel Canelli
The Intelligencer
October 6, 2009

Field of Toxicology Offers Possibilities


Because twenty-first century toxicology is such a multi-disciplinary effort, it is essential that toxicologists have the opportunity to share their needs and challenges with the greater scientific community, thus opening doors for important collaboration.

Those of us who follow regulatory toxicology have long known that toxicology, dormant for decades, is emerging as one of the next hot fields of research. There is both need and opportunity. While the benefits of many recent scientific developments are still hypothetical and far off, the new system of toxicology envisioned by Hartung and others harnesses (and influences) the latest, exciting advances in biology, chemistry, and biotechnology to produce tools and data that have immediate, real-world applications. It is a field of study that is directly responsible for protecting human, animal, and environmental health. We have only begun to realize what is possible, and with the right support, funding, and organization, the brightest minds in science will be busy working on this new toxicology.

Nina Mak, AAVS Research Analyst
Nature
Submitted July 10, 2009
Dear friends,

I sometimes feel like a lightning rod for animals in need. From lost dogs to injured mice, I’ve come across many creatures who have wandered from home, fallen victim to sickness, or lost their parents. Every summer, I find myself rescuing crayfish and turtles crawling around sidewalks and parking lots in my development. I always become the traffic officer when flocks of geese decide to amble across busy highways. Sadly, many people unable or unwilling to care for their companion animals will dump them in parks and other public areas, leaving these poor pets to fend for themselves. I’ve had more than one unexpected house guest stay the night.

Should you find yourself faced with similar situations, stay calm and be prepared. I always have gloves, towels, and a crate in my trunk. Know the locations of your local animal shelters, vet clinics, and wildlife rehabilitation centers, and have their contact info programmed in your cell phone and GPS. Even injured animals can be elusive, so you may need help on occasion. But don’t put yourself at risk, especially when dealing with rabies vector species and feral dogs—you may have to resort to calling the police or animal control services.

There won’t always be a happy ending for every “tail” —sometimes you may be able only to spare a dying animal from suffering alone. And that’s worth the effort. Animals don’t always understand when we’re trying to help them, probably because so many humans are apathetic or intentionally try to harm them. But I know how much you love animals, and I know you’ll always do the right thing.

Thank you for caring.

Best regards,

Chris Derer

Director of Development & Member Services

PS. Some of you are probably seasoned veterans at dealing with these sorts of situations – feel free to contact me with advice, suggestions, and your own stories!

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TINA NELSON SANCTUARY FUND

What if you could make their pain go away? You can.

More and more often, animals in labs are being given a second chance. AAVS offers members the opportunity to direct special contributions to care for animals who were once used in laboratories or exploited in other ways.

Through the Tina Nelson Sanctuary Fund, named in memory of AAVS’s Executive Director from 1995 – 2005, donors can support one of our most rewarding programs, providing grants to sanctuaries that help animals recover and live in peace. One hundred percent of donations go toward the grant program.

To see a listing of the sanctuaries that have received grants from AAVS, go to www.aavs.org/SanctuaryFund.
In memory and honor of William Cave (AAVS President, 1978-1990).
— Richard Abbott
Santa Paula, CA

In memory of Kitty- Cat
— Anonymous

In memory of Katrina and Kisses.
— Anonymous

In memory of Murphy and Ogelsby. Friends—you are missed!
— Anonymous

In memory of our precious cat, Princess, who touched our lives and who still touches our memory every day.
— Carole Westman-Dadurka
San Clemente, CA

In memory of Saavik.
— Jeff Nicodemus
Panama City, FL

In memory of Pammie McVeigh, who was killed by a drunk driver in 1986. She loved wild Alaska.
— Anonymous

In memory of Gwen, a loyal companion for 15 years.
— Jane Austrian
New York, NY

In loving memory of my parents, Ted and Louise Moraghan.
— Eileen Breslin
Easton, PA

In loving memory of Ella Harp.
— Patricia Cheney
Warrenton, PA

In memory of Shawnee, who taught me the important things in life: to
— love, respect, and care for our animal friends.
  — Dianne Douglas
  Phoenix, AZ

In memory of Oscar, the world’s finest cat. We shared 18 years of love and devotion.
— Gwenn Gröndal
Carlsbad, CA

In memory of Max. I miss you every day.
— Sarah Galbraith
Harrisburg, PA

In memory of Puki and Cody Stamper, for your love and gentleness for the benefit of other sentient beings.
— Ewa Stamper
Kailua, HI

In memory of Abby. Thank you for nearly 15 years of love. We miss you dearly!
— Sylvia Anderson
Mesa, AZ

In loving memory of Molly, a very special cat. Always in our hearts, we miss you, sweetie.
— Louise and Gerald Feulner
Maywood, NJ

In memory of Little Jenny, a loyal and good little dog. She has gone over the Rainbow Bridge now; I’m sure she is in God’s hands.
— Hazel Lavalley
Tavares, FL

In memory of Francois. We still miss you.
— Joy Casey
Clayton, NC

In memory of Okie Bug (12-22-96 to 02-09-07), our beloved Beagle who left
— his paw prints on our hearts forever.
  — Pamela Wilson
  Broken Arrow, OK

In memory of Annie Weed, a sweet little girl given love by Carol-Anne and Don; she gave love in return.
— Elaine and Frederick Voltz
Pacific Grove, CA

In memory of Magnus. Found on the streets of Philadelphia, Magnus lit up our lives for 18 happy years and was the dog who loved everyone.
— Eleanor Hubbard White
Vineyard Haven, MA

In memory of Nora and Ernst Holgerson, for all your good work and kindness.
— Betty Jeppesen
Santa Barbara, CA

In memory of Marylou Campana, my twin, who was a great supporter of animals, and for Casey, a special Calico friend who passed on in October 2008.
— Virginia Campana
Morgantown, WV

In memory of Rita B. Falchek.
— Stephen Falchek
Wynnewood, PA

In memory of Mom.
— Nancy Kasmar
Audubon NJ

In memory of Rajah and Claire Oey.
— Aimee Oey: Brooklyn NY

In loving memory of dear little Suzymbear Rabbit.
— Emily Stuparyk
Winnipeg, Manitoba Canada

AAVS MEMORIAL FUND

The Memorial Fund is a unique way of paying tribute to companion animals and animal lovers while making a gift in their name to help stop animal suffering. All AAVS memorial gifts are used to continue our mission’s work of ending the use of animals in biomedical research, product testing, and education.

Memorial donations of any amount are greatly appreciated. A tribute with a donation of $50.00 or more will be published in the AV Magazine and also acknowledged in a special recognition section of AAVS’s Annual Report. At your request, we will notify the family of the individual you have remembered with your memorial gift.

Additionally, tributes and memorials are now posted in a special section on the newly redesigned AAVS website at www.aavs.org/trIBUTE.
Resources for Review

Want to explore more about the ethical considerations of animal exploitation? To get started, check out these thought-provoking publications.

Books

**Animal Liberation**
By Peter Singer
The book that many believe formed the foundation of the modern animal rights movement. A must read for all advocates!

**Beyond Animal Rights: A Feminist Caring Ethic for the Treatment of Animals**
Josephine Donovan and Carol Adams, Editors
A collection of essays discussing animal rights ethics from the feminist ethic-of-care tradition perspective.

**The Case for Animal Rights**
By Tom Regan
A seminal work based on inherent value theory, Regan argues that animals are deserving of the sort of moral rights afforded to humans, including the right to live.

**Animals’ Rights**
By Henry Salt
First published a century ago, this is considered a classic in animal rights literature.

**Animal Rights and Human Morality**
By Bernard E. Rollin
Opening with a discussion of the moral status of animals, Rollin argues that the more we use animals, the greater our obligation is to protect them.

**Strolling with Our Kin: Speaking for and Respecting Voiceless Animals**
By Marc Bekoff
Powerful and positive, Bekoff draws on young people's natural sense of wonder to stimulate ethical concern for animals. Great for younger audiences.

**Dominion: The Power of Man, the Suffering of Animals, and the Call to Mercy**
By Matthew Scully
Former special assistant and senior speechwriter to President George W. Bush, Scully presents a powerful new portrait of the obligation humans have to animals, demanding government and individual reform.

**Victims of Science: the use of animals in research**
By Richard Ryder
A noted pioneer in the animal rights movement who coined the term specieism, Ryder outlines a moral argument against animal experimentation in this historically important book.

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**AV Magazine**
Featuring a unique collection of essays, each of these issues of the AV Magazine explore the ethics of using animals in research, testing, and education. (available at www.aavs.org/publications)

“Ethics: Thinking Outside the Cage” (Spring, 2002)


**Websites**

Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics
The first of its kind, the Centre is dedicated to promoting ethical perspectives on animals through academic research and teaching, and is headed by Andrew Linzey (p. 8).
www.oxfordanimalethics.com

Animals & Society Institute
An independent research and education organization dedicated to advancing the status of animals in public policy and promotes the study of human-animal relationships.
www.animalsandsociety.org
One act of kindness can be your legacy, too.

Over 125 years ago, AAVS was founded by social visionary Caroline Earle White. Knowing that small acts of kindness can make a difference for animals, she tirelessly worked to improve the lives of those who were in need of loving homes, labored on city streets, and suffered in laboratories.

Make her legacy yours.

You can help ensure that Caroline Earle White’s vision and the work of AAVS continues far into the future. For information on estate planning and becoming a member of the Caroline Earle White Society. Please visit www.aavs.org/PlannedGiving, or contact Chris Derer, Director of Development & Member Services at: 215-887-0816/cderer@aavs.org.
To care for anyone else enough to make their problems one’s own, is ever the beginning of one’s real ethical development.

FELIX ADLER